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INDIA´S PLACE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF BRAZIL: THE 
MULTILATERAL NEXUS 
Mauricio Santoro Rocha1 
Abstract: Cooperation between Brazil and India in multilateral organizations goes back to the 
1960s, with common positions in several United Nations´ agencies and in the GATT. In the 
current period, post-Cold War, it has been the strongest characteristic of the relation among 
both countries, with partnerships in many global fora, such as BRICS, G4, G20, BASIC, and 
IBSA, with common goals of reforming the international system in order to attend the demands 
of emerging nations. This affinity – the multilateral nexus - creates possibilities for Brazilian 
foreign policy regarding an Asia on the rise, including the opportunity for some balancing for 
the growing influence of China.  
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Resumo: A cooperação entre Brasil e Índia nas organizações multilaterais remonta à década de 
1960, com posições comuns em diversas agências da ONU e no GATT. No período 
contemporâneo, pós-Guerra Fria, tem sido a característica mais forte da relação entre os dois 
países, com parcerias em muitos fóruns globais, como BRICS, G4, G20, BASIC, IBAS, com 
objetivos comuns de reforma do sistema internacional em prol das demandas de nações 
emergentes. Essa afinidade – o nexo multilateral - cria possibilidades para a política externa 
brasileira com respeito a uma Ásia em ascensão, inclusive como oportunidade para algum tipo 
de equilíbrio à influência crescente da China.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 The international order of the post-Cold War is changing towards a bigger role for Asia, 
especially because the economic and political rise of China and India. This new global scenario 
poses challenges to Brazilian foreign policy.  This text is an essay with a focus on Brazil-India 
relations, which aims to enrich the debate about Brazilian diplomacy. India is increasing 
becoming one of the most important bilateral relationships for Brazil, but there is still scarce 
academic literature on the subject, at least in comparison with traditional diplomatic partners 
such as Argentina and the United States.  
This article argues that India will have a central place in Brazil´s relations with a rising 
Asia, especially due to the “multilateral nexus”: Brasília and Delhi are the only partners that 
share membership in all of the following fora and organizations: G4, financial and commercial 
G20, BRICS, BASIC, IBSA (Viana Júnior, 2017). They are building upon a history of 
successful cooperation during the Cold War that happened in spite of the lack of strong 
economic bonds or ideological proximity (Bettarello, 2017; Vieira, 2009; Vazquez, 2019).  
Their common interests in the management and reform of global governance can be the 
starting point for deepening bilateral relations, something that would give Brazil a stronger 
ground to improve initiatives in emerging markets in South and Southeast Asia, and to have 
more leverage in negotiations with China.  
This article starts with an overview of the current relations between Brazil and India and 
a brief synthesis of their bilateral diplomatic history. After that, the paper discusses the 
multilateral agenda that both nations have been pursuing in the post-Cold War era. The final 
section of the text deals with the positive spillovers that the cooperation can have for Brazil in 
Asia. 
 
II. Brief Overview of Brazil-India Relations 
 
 Brazilians often compare India with China – rising Asian powers with giant populations 
and ancient cultures. The similarities exist, but they lead to misperceptions about what Brazil 
may expect from each country. Trade and investments dominate the relations with China, for 
the Chinese have been Brazilian´s biggest economic partners for the last 10 years. India is a 
different story and probably will remain so in the near future. Sino-Brazilian trade is about 
US$100 billion per year – a 50x increase since the early 2000s. In contrast, the trade between 
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Brazil and India rose slowly in the 2010s to US$5 billions. It is an expressive number by itself, 
but nowhere near the Chinese economic impact.  
 There is a rich bilateral agenda dealing with many issues, such as defense, culture, 
education, science and innovation, with potential to grow (Viana Jr, 2017). The relationship 
greatly improved since the 2000s, when both nations established a strategic partnership, 
recognizing each other as rising powers of the Global South with common interests2: 
Dismal until the early 2000s, bilateral relations gained new momentum with 
the establishment of the Brazil-India strategic partnership in 2006. Of all the 
countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, Brazil remains India’s 
only ‘strategic partner’ with some identified long-term complementarities, 
shared global vision and democratic values, and a commitment to foster 
economic growth with social inclusion for the welfare of their people. The two 
countries, however, have not yet developed clear strategies towards each other 
and stereotypes continue to reinforce the existing lack of knowledge between 
both societies. (Vazquez, 2019: 26) 
 
 Naturally, it is the interest of Brasília and Delhi to increase bilateral trade and 
investment, and to identify business opportunities for companies of their countries. But it is 
difficult to imagine that the economic side will be the most important aspect of their relations, 
due to the nature of their societies and few compatibilities between their economies which will 
be further explored below. 
With 43% of the Indian population working in small-scale agriculture3, Delhi has been 
very cautious concerning the opening of the domestic market towards the agribusiness that is 
so strong a part of Brazil´s exports. Similarly, Brasília has been historically reluctant to open 
its national sector of services and information technology, which are the biggest share in India´s 
exports. Actually, this divergence was one of the reasons why both nations failed in reaching 
an agreement at the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (Vieira and Alden, 2011: p. 
513). 
 History plays a big role in these obstacles. The Portuguese seaborne empire had 
connected Brazil and the Indian Goa in the past: “the commercial relations between both 
colonies were accepted by the Portuguese Crown reaching their apex in 1783-1820, to became 
almost null after the Brazilian independence” (Vieira, 2009: p.44, translated by the author).  
There was never a big migration flow between both countries, in contrast with other 
Asia-Latin America population flows, such as the big Indian diaspora in some Caribbean islands 
                                                          
2 An official timeline can be found at 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5238&Itemid=478&cod_pais=I
ND&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=pt-BR. Access in December 2019.  
3 Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS. Access in January 2019. 
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and Suriname, or the Brazilian-Japanese migrations. In contrast, during the 1990s there were 
less than one hundred Brazilians living in India and similar low numbers of Indians in Brazil. 
(Stuenkel, 2010; Vieira; 2009).  
During the second half of the 20th century, Brazil and India pursued inward-looking 
development models, where the State was an important actor in economic production and 
protectionist measures restricted imports and tried to stimulate local industry.  
The results achieved were very different. Brazilian developmentalism managed big 
economic growth rate in the 1950s-1970s, but India´s “licence Raj” often showed a low 
performance. Both countries faced financial crisis in the 1980s and started to open their markets 
in response to that and to the changing international situation. However, they remained 
economies that do not have a high structural compatibility, and had little trade and investment 
with each other. 
 International politics have been an arena where Brazil and India found much more room 
to cooperate. They share a history of dialogue in several United Nations´ fora, such as the search 
for trade rules which would benefit more the developing nations (United Nations Conference 
for Trade and Development, G-77 at the UN, G-10 in the Uruguay Round of GATT) and in 
common rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty during the 1960s-1980s. (Oliveira, 2012; 
Vieira, 2009: p.49-51). 
 In the 1960s, there was a big interest from India in developing stronger ties with Latin 
America in general, and Brazil in particular. It was a response from Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira 
Gandhi´s administrations to the Cuban Revolution, to the Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy 
of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart4, and to the possibility of including some countries of the 
region in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Gandhi visited Latin America as prime-minister 
and discussed the idea of joining the Organization of American States as an observer – which 
would happen, but just in 1991. (Musto, 2018).  
 It is interesting to note that this rapprochement happened despite different positions in 
the Cold War. India was perhaps the most important leader of the NAM and had close relations 
with the Soviet Union. Brazil was part of the Western Bloc, although it often searched for more 
autonomy from the United States. Brazilians and Indians were against colonialism and 
supported self-determination of African and Asian nations, but the strength of Brazil bonds with 
                                                          
4 The Independent Foreign Policy was an attempt by the Brazilian governments in the early 1960s to develop a 
more autonomous diplomacy face the United States and Cold War restraints, establishing or strengthening relations 
with Eastern Europe and the new nations created by decolonization in Africa and Asia.  
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Portugal sometimes created contradictions and limitations in these positions, including a hostile 
reaction to India´s takeover of the Portuguese colony of Goa. 
Brazil and India market reforms in the 1990s opened the way for stronger relations. Each 
country saw in the other an important partner, a regional power in a more global world, where 
international influence was migrating from the West to the rising developing nations. Visits of 
presidents and prime ministers started to happen more often. There was also an important 
convergence in terms of economic policy, with the implementation of pro-market reforms such 
as a more open trade regime.  
 
III. The multilateral nexus in the 21st century 
  
Brasília and Delhi discovered that they had much to gain supporting the other in the new 
multilateral agendas of the post-Cold War. Together with Germany and Japan they formed the 
G4 in 2005 to put pressure on the reform of the UN Security Council and establish a permanent 
place for themselves. In 2006, Brazil and India stablished their own strategic partnership.  
 At the World Trade Organization (WTO), Brazil and India were key players in the 
negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 and in the 
use of generic drugs (2001). Both countries were also important in creating the G-20 at the 
WTO (2003), putting together twenty of the biggest developing nations to discuss trade and 
other economic issues.  
The BASIC group (Brazil, China, India and South Africa) was created in 2009 as an 
actor in dialogues about climate change, part of  a bigger trend that the old G7 is not enough 
anymore do deal with the complex architecture of the global economy and international politics. 
(Hurrell et alli, 2009; Vargas, 2010). 
This affinity in several global fora became so strong that veteran Indian diplomats would 
advise their younger colleagues in multilateral organizations that “when in doubt, follow 
Brazil´s position” (quoted in Viana Júnior, 2017, p. 104, translated by the author). 
The cooperation between Brazil and India is also an important part of the story of the 
peaceful rise of China. The participation of these two big democracies in the BRICS helped to 
ease tensions that the group would follow the authoritarian practices of Beijing and Moscow. 
This became even more important in 2014 with the creation of the New Development Bank and 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Both have big investment portfolio in several 
nations and deal with strategic issues such as energy and transport. 
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Brazil, India - and South Africa as a junior partner - are the soft face of the BRICS. 
Together with their own initiative, the IBSA Forum, they can act as brokers between the West, 
civil society organizations and China and Russia, at least in issues like human rights, 
democracy, and the protection of minorities. 
 At the same time, they may help the rich global north societies to pay more attention to 
the troubles of developing nations and argue the case for the need to change rules of multilateral 
institutions to better represent the new world realities of the 21st century. Brazil and India are 
not revisionist powers who want to destroy the international order: they are reformist actors that 
search for peaceful, gradual change. A strategy of “soft balance”, as called by Hurrell (2009). 
The cooperation of Brasília and Delhi since the 2000s already has an impressive record 
of achievement, both in multilateral organizations and in the BRICS (Stuenkel, 2015). There 
also many issues where both countries can improve their coordination in multilaterals forums 
to boost their national interests. Some examples are: 
• International peace and security: with the reform of the UN Security Council out of the 
mainstream of global agenda, other issues deserve more attention: the rules that govern 
the use of force, the need for a more cautious approach to military intervention, 
especially in North Africa and the Middle East (Libya, Syria, Yemen). The doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect must be better developed, and the Brazilian idea of 
“Responsibility While Protecting” is a good starting point.  
• Environment, climate change, right to water. The American decision of leave the Paris 
Agreement increases the responsibility of the BASIC countries concerning global 
negotiations on climate, highlighting issues such as water scarcity, which is becoming 
a serious problem in all countries of the group. 
• Internet Governance and Information technology. Brazil and India are important global 
players in these agendas, with a common position of criticism of the US-led ICANN 
regime. Together, they can make BRICS a more effective group on the issue, as least 
regarding the minimum common ground of strengthening the UN in Internet 
governance. (Hurel and Santoro, 2018). 
• International promotion of democracy and human rights. Democracy is in crisis in many 
countries, with the rise of populist and authoritarian reactions to globalization. Brazil 
and India are not immune to these troubles, but they can present an approach to the 
promotion of democratic values and human rights that is less interventionist than the 
West, based upon their own histories of social achievement (Stuenkel, 2010). 
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IV. The Asian Spillover for Brazil of the Multilateral Nexus 
  
Brazil and India multilateral cooperation is important in itself, and it can help both 
countries to improve global governance towards their needs and demands. However, there is a 
bonus for Brazilian foreign policy. Better relations with Delhi may also give Brasília more 
leverage in the dialogues with Beijing and open perspectives for Brazil in some sub-regions of 
Asia, especially the South and the Southeast. 
 The relation with China is one of the more important for the current Brazilian foreign 
policy. The Chinese market is the destination of about 30% of the national exports, and the 
source of billions of dollars in investment (Cariello, 2019). But these strong economic links 
come with limitations: 80% of the Brazilians sales to China are concentrated in three 
commodities (soy, oil, iron ore).5 Beijing has lots of power to define that agenda as a price-
taker or to settle tariffs and other forms of trade barriers that may cause harm to Brasília. 
 Brazil has few cards to play in order to gain better conditions in its dealings with China. 
However, a strong relation with Delhi would give Brasília more advantages in its dialogue with 
Beijing. This is the same spirit that in the past oriented “triangular relations” between Brazil, 
United States and Europe or Latin America. The potential gains for Brazil are even bigger this 
time, due to what is at stake in the Sino-Indian disputes for borders and influence in the Indian 
Ocean. 
 Other positive spillover for Brazil of the multilateral nexus is using the connection with 
India to open diplomatic possibilities with its allies in Asia. The rising living conditions in the 
continent are creating a broader middle class with hundreds of millions of consumers. These 
are important assets for Brazilian foreign policy, but in many cases the government or private 
companies lack information or good contacts that could result in economic gains for Brazil. 
(Barbosa, 2017). 
 India may provide some of these, at least in South and Southeast Asia. Emerging 
markets such as the 10-country nations of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations  (Asean), 
with 500 million inhabitants, are very promising for Brazil. The post-authoritarian transitions 
in Myanmar and Sri Lanka and the successful experiences in social policy in Bangladesh also 
create opportunities. Special initiatives inside BRICS or IBSA could give a better institutional 
approach to boost Brazil´s presence in these regions. 
                                                          
5 Source: http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/comercio-exterior/estatisticas-de-comercio-exterior. Access in 
January 2019. 
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 Last, but not least, Brazil must also be aware of the new regional institutions which are 
a growing influence in Asia´s regional security complex, especially the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). Some kind of dialogue between SCO and BRICS would be good for 
Brazilian diplomats and military officers, enabling them to have a better understanding of the 




 The rise of Asia is perhaps the most important characteristic of the new post-Cold War 
world order. The core of that change is the increasing power of China and India. Brasília must 
search for a stronger bilateral relation with Delhi, but due to the structure of the economy of 
both countries, on the short run the best way to conduct this is through the multilateral nexus, 
with more and better cooperation with India in the UN, BRICS, IBAS, BASIC, G4, and both 
G20 and other international groups and organizations. 
 That agenda would improve from the achievements of the past, especially that Brazil 
and India do not need to share the same positions on the major global issues of the day in order 
to have a good level of cooperation in multilateral fora. That happens because both nations are 
moderate revisionists who want peaceful and gradual reform in an international order led by 
the West, even if they have different national identities and if they relate to the United States 
and European Union in their own ways. 
 The multilateral dialogue between Brasília and Delhi has many points: economic global 
governance, climate change, a cautious approach towards international rules for the use of the 
force, a less interventionist perspective for the promotion of democracy and human rights, the 
will to change the Internet regime, and so on. These conversations boost the national interest of 
both countries, and for Brazil they have the extra benefit of opening good possibilities for 
diplomatic action in the emerging markets of South and Southeast Asia.  
 Although there is a good level of dialogue among both governments, the interaction 
between the civil societies of Brazil and India is still quite low and there is need for more 
people-to-people diplomacy (Vazquez, 2019: 28). This is the best to identify there points of the 
bilateral agenda with more potential to grow. 
 On the short term, Brazil´s presidency of the BRICS offers an important framework for 
the dialogue with India, with the decision to focus on educational and scientific cooperation. 6 
                                                          
6 Source: http://brics2019.itamaraty.gov.br/presidencia-brasileira-2019/mote-e-prioridades. Access on December 
2019. 
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A mutual understanding in these areas can be the basis for the multilateral action of both 
countries in fields such as Internet governance and other IT issues, as highlighted in this paper.  
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